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Abstract
Ilona Kickbusch’s thought provoking editorial is criticized in this commentary, partly because she fails to refer 
to previous critical work on the global conditions and policies that sustain inequality, poverty, poor health and 
damage to the biosphere and, as a result, she misreads global power and elides consideration of the fundamental 
historical structures of political and material power that shape agency in global health governance. We also 
doubt that global health can be improved through structures and processes of multilateralism that are premised 
on the continued reproduction of the ecologically myopic and socially unsustainable market civilization model 
of capitalist development that currently prevails in the world economy. This model drives net financial flows 
from poor to rich countries and from the poor to the affluent and super wealthy individuals. By contrast, we 
suggest that significant progress in global health requires a profound and socially just restructuring of global 
power, greater global solidarity and the “development of sustainability.”
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Ilona Kickbusch’s important editorial suggests that a global power shift is occurring, involving “the rise of the rest” relative to the United States, and with it, changes in the 
nature of multilateralism. This may mean that 2016 could be 
a turning point towards improved global health and better 
global health governance.1 Her points of departure are: (1) 
The failures of our development models to improve health, 
to narrow disparities and to attend to the most vulnerable 
populations in fragile states; (2) Inadequacy of current global 
health governing mechanisms, and (3) Some optimism arising 
from new resolve for improving global health associated 
with recent economic advances in low- and middle-income 
countries and from resolutions emanating from international 
conferences. We are in agreement with her first two points but 
we are critical of her article on several grounds. 
Failure to Acknowledge Previous Analyses
First, she fails to acknowledge a wide range of work that has 
analysed and critiqued global structures and the specific 
failings to which she refers – her most distant reference is to 
2004. Consideration of previous work might help to better 
reveal some of the fundamental realities of power that have 
shaped and continue to shape global health governance. At 
least since the 1970s the adverse impacts of human activities 
on the environment,2-4 global health,5-7 the instability of 
populations who are becoming refugees,8 the (im)morality 
of the global economy with its adverse effects on democracy9 
and the multiple crises that threaten life in general, have all 
been critically addressed.10,11 
For example, in 1980 Johan Galtung emphasised the 
significance of the underlying structures of power that 
configure the possibilities for action or agency in global 
affairs: 
“There is a crisis in the world today, now felt even by those of 
us who enjoy the power and privilege at the top of the world. 
There is a crisis of violence …. There is a crisis of misery, 
and threat of poverty. There is a crisis of repression, and 
threat of repression of all human rights. There is a crisis in 
the environment …. At the root of the crises is not resource 
scarcity or price increases or population pressure, but the 
world structure.”12
Much has changed since Galtung wrote. The world has become 
much more capitalist and unequal following the collapse of 
the Soviet Bloc, and threats to the biosphere have multiplied 
and accelerated, particularly since China has increasingly 
become integrated into the now dominant market-based, but 
increasingly crisis-prone, capitalist accumulation structures. 
The contemporary magnitude of global crises has been 
reflected in some recent books.13,14
In this context, we would argue that current frameworks of 
multilateralism are ultimately constituted and shaped by the 
fundamental economic and political structures, forces and 
knowledge frameworks that configure the global political 
economy, namely those of actually existing neoliberal 
capitalism. Prevailing frameworks of global governance are 
premised upon a dominant energy-intensive neoliberal market 
civilization model of development, in a global system ultimately 
protected by the geopolitical power of the United States and its 
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principal allies.15 The market civilization model is, however, 
contradictory: whilst it is premised upon individualism and 
the realisation of self through consumerism, it rests upon 
a socially unsustainable and ecologically myopic idea of 
“consume today and forget about the future.”16 This model 
depends upon acceleration in energy-intensive production 
and distribution patterns that increase the depletion of non-
renewable resources and generate vast quantities of pollution 
and waste. By definition the market civilization model is 
socially exclusive and tends to predominantly benefit an 
affluent minority of the world’s population that consumes a 
growing proportion of global resources and services, whereas 
billions of people are deemed to be disposable or are expelled 
from the world economy as largely irrelevant.17 At issue, 
therefore, in this contradictory world order is the struggle 
for reasonable conditions of existence amid mechanisms and 
developments that are endangering the health of us all and of 
the planet. 
Whilst there is no single cause for the developments just 
outlined, we have argued recently that it is undeniable that some 
of the principal historical forces involved are connected to the 
structures and processes associated with the specific model of 
development that prevails in capitalism today.16 This neoliberal 
market civilization model involves structural acceleration in 
processes within the world economy that together produce 
contradictions inimical to the general health of populations 
and the sustainability of the biosphere. Whilst we cannot go 
into detail on any of these points, it is worth listing some of 
them here. They include (1) Intensification of the exploitation 
of human beings, social processes, and nature for purposes 
of profit; (2) Incremental dispossession of communities of 
their basic and local means of subsistence and livelihood; (3) 
Acceleration in the turnover time of the production and sale 
of commodities to generate quicker accumulation of profits 
for firms and investors; and (4) Restructuring or privatization 
of previously public institutions and public goods, including 
provisions for healthcare and education. As the latter become 
increasingly subject to market forces and values, they are 
treated like commodities that can be simply bought and sold 
for reasons of profit.18 All the above go with greater inequality 
and social dislocation as well as pollution, toxicity, planned 
obsolescence, waste and relatively uncontrolled despoliation 
of the environment – at the expense of conditions for healthy 
living, and for delivery of healthcare.
In the case of health, the forms of power/knowledge that 
define agendas for policy and research are shaped by the 
power of large corporations and governments premised 
upon governance through mechanisms associated with 
market forces. In global health, this specifically means large 
pharmaceutical corporations, well-capitalized privately 
oriented philanthropies such as the Wellcome Trust or the 
Gates Foundation, private medical insurance firms and a 
related academic/health science complex. A market-driven 
system structures the nature of the research and training of 
medical and health personnel. The system tends to focus 
principally on therapies for afflictions that yield profit 
– the diseases of the affluent, or those who are able to pay 
for the treatment. It is increasingly associated with private 
ownership/control over medical education and research, 
healthcare provision, insurance and the provision of drugs 
and therapies. This pattern is reflected in the work of the 
Consortium of Universities on Global Health, configured by a 
biomedical model of disease that pays little or no attention to 
powerful causal structures that generate poor health, a model 
oriented towards the health of individuals as opposed to that 
of whole populations. 
We might add here that capitalist enterprises are not focused 
on the promotion of the global health of the world’s population 
for its own sake, but rather on the accumulation of capital via 
the profit system. Thus, capital can profit from obesity as well 
as from hunger, and will only invest its resources in markets 
that have the capacity to buy the goods and services that it 
is able to supply. In a capitalist market system, prices and 
incomes determine if one eats or starves: the poor go hungry. 
This contradiction partly helps to explain why we are now 
living in a world where 25% of the world’s population is obese 
and 25% of the world’s population is starving or virtually 
starving,19 and wide disparities in health and longevity 
persist.20
So what do these developments reflect? Simply put (neo-
liberal) capitalism is not just a set of economic or market-
based processes but also a (contradictory and highly unequal) 
system of power. This should not be confused with a power 
shift from the United States towards “the rest.” Rather the shift 
or more accurately, the redistribution of social and economic 
power, is from the poor- and middle-classes to the wealthy, 
both in the United States, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) and much of the rest of the world. 
This is why in today’s global political economy recent patterns 
of accumulation generate a situation in 2016 where a mere 62 
super-rich people hold more wealth than half of the world’s 
people (3.6 billion people); the top 1% now own more than 
the other 99% of the world’s people combined. Since 2010 the 
wealth of the poorest half of the world’s people has dropped 
by 38% (by one trillion dollars). “Meanwhile the wealth of the 
richest 62 (9 were women) has increased by more than half 
a trillion dollars to $1.76 trillion.”21 Indeed, the plutocracy’s 
share of global wealth has been massively amplified since the 
2008 global financial crash, partly because any losses they 
sustained were socialised by governments bailing them out, 
and subsequently they could take advantage of very cheap 
loans in the loose monetary conditions provided by central 
banks in response to the crisis, enabling them to make much 
more money.22 One indicator of the priorities of this system of 
global governance since 2008, therefore, is the gigantic sums 
made available to bailout large capitalist enterprises (estimates 
for the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union 
(EU) between 2008-2013 vary between $17 trillion and $40 
trillion) in response to the possibility of a meltdown of global 
capitalism. These sums massively outweighed the relatively 
very small and now diminishing amounts dedicated to the 
transfer of aid to poor countries and for the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (MDGs were replaced in 2016 
by the Sustainable Development Goals). 
Nevertheless, the policy choices just noted need to be assessed 
in terms of what economists call their “opportunity costs,” 
namely the alternatives that are foregone in favouring some 
policies over others. As noted above, much of the enormous 
transfer of material resources since the crash of 2008 has 
been carried out through monetary policies – which have 
Gill and Benatar
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(4), 237–241 239
only indirect effects on general economic conditions. By 
contrast fiscal policy, which has much more direct, focused 
and immediate effects, might have been targeted to build new 
hospitals, schools, infrastructure, daycare facilities, renewable 
energy resources, and other socially and ecologically beneficial 
investments as well as to fund-related activities and jobs. This 
would have had the effect of not only improving health and 
social conditions but also creating jobs, and injecting liquidity 
into the economy in ways that would help to regenerate cleaner 
and more socially responsive patterns of economic growth. It 
would have addressed some of the problems associated with 
the global financial and economic crisis and deteriorating 
provisions for healthcare. However, fiscal policy (specifically 
expenditures) has been relatively under-utilized in response 
to the crisis, reflected in policies of fiscal austerity that have 
been used in much of the world.
Moreover, the opportunity costs of opting to favour monetary 
policy are rarely publicly debated. This is despite the fact 
that monetary policy tends to transfer resources principally 
to financial institutions and to those firms and individuals 
who are able to access large amounts of credit (loans), which 
by definition largely excludes the majority of society. Lest 
this point be misunderstood as simply the view of critics of 
neoliberal capitalism, we can cite evidence provided by one of 
the principal beneficiaries of the recent monetary expansion, 
wealthy financial capitalist George Soros. He demystified 
some of this policy choice and its effects in a speech at the 
2015 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Soros 
pointed out that the continued use of monetary policies 
would “increase inequality between rich and poor both 
in regards of the countries and people.” He further argued 
that, “excessive reliance on monetary policy tends to enrich 
the owners of property and at the same time will not relieve 
the downward pressure on wages.”23 On a global basis, this 
policy choice, widely adopted across the G-20, reflects what 
Stanley Druckenmiller, the billionaire hedge fund manager 
(and former associate of Soros) pronounced was “The biggest 
redistribution of wealth from the middle-class and the poor 
to the rich ever.”24
The priorities of global governance are, therefore, very clear 
and it would be surprising if those priorities did not influence 
the agenda for the various conferences and initiatives as well 
as the material provisions allocated to and informing the 
global governance of health. 
In a nutshell, global governance frameworks are still dominated 
by the wealthier sections of society and the ruling strata of 
the United States and its G-7 allies, in a framework that now 
incorporates their counterparts in the G-20, including the 
BRICS. However, even if one were to concede that have been 
some shifts in power at the global level it would be highly 
unlikely to result in changes in the basic political economy 
frameworks that underpin the governance of global health. 
For example, a close look at the BRICS enables dismissal of 
the idea that they are significantly influencing global health as 
a unified political bloc, despite evidence of some cooperation 
on finance and in health, with one or two BRICS countries 
supporting specific health initiatives. Nor are they threatening 
the frameworks of market-based neoliberal governance based 
upon public-private partnerships in delivering medical and 
health systems. The truth of this latter reality is partly reflected 
in Kickbusch’s points concerning the emerging trend towards 
“smart investment” and “commercial diplomacy” on the part 
of donors so that their pharmaceutical firms can benefit from 
a “bonanza” in supplying to new markets such as China, 
the biggest economy of the BRICS.1 Furthermore, if one 
looks closely at the new international trade and investment 
agreements – the ones that go beyond the Nairobi agreement 
(mentioned by Kickbusch) – what is striking is how far the 
BRICS and other poorer countries either go along with or 
actively support much greater marketization, liberalization, 
and privatization of goods and services, stronger guarantees 
for private property rights (including intellectual property 
rights agreements governing private ownership of patents for 
drugs and pharmaceutical products) thereby   endorsing wider 
freedoms for large corporations. This allows corporations 
to press for greater commodification of healthcare and 
other social provisions, in ways consistent with the market 
civilization model outlined above.
New Financial Systems
Our second criticism, therefore, relates to her optimism based 
on new financial institutions with shifts in donor strategies 
and on rapid economic growth in Africa and other poor 
countries. We consider such optimism to be misplaced for 
several reasons: (1) The relevance of the economic growth 
of poor countries has been overplayed (given that Africa 
accounts for about 20% of the world’s population but only 5%-
6% of global gross domestic product [GDP])25 and there is a 
looming famine in Nigeria, Africa’s biggest economy; (2) The 
mal-distribution of that growth results in little improvement 
for the majority; (3) Associated corruption brings (in Africa 
and world wide) as many or more problems than it solves26,27; 
(4) As noted above, and reflecting a wider global pattern, the 
net flow of resources for many years has been predominantly 
from the poor to the wealthy28; and (5) The dominant model 
of development is built on intensification of exploitation and 
has created both great wealth and rising inequalities, while 
neglecting equity and sustainability.29,30
By contrast, we have noted elsewhere that it is not impossible 
to imagine or to identify alternatives to these dominant 
models, since democratic, typically grass-roots organisations, 
premised upon sustainable forms of healthcare and 
production of food and methods of livelihood, are actually 
asserting themselves in action in various parts of the world: 
“New forces are discernible in Latin America, more incipiently 
across Europe and indeed, in many parts of the world. They 
reflect new concepts of leadership, understood as involving 
a plurality of diverse forces in a collective movement – with 
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of intellectuals 
providing it with new concepts, organisational potentials 
and a multiple forms of leadership.”16
Global Health and Global Health Governance are Politics 
Writ Large
Thirdly, while Kickbusch is correct that the challenges ahead 
are deeply political she fails to address fundamental ways in 
which power, power structures and dynamics and the nature 
of actually existing capitalism and its links to global health 
could and should be addressed in order to be able to think 
about the future in a basically new way.18 Indeed, she makes 
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no mention of the fact that the problems we face today are 
also the legacy of centuries of imperialism and colonialism, 
and of ideological and political agendas that have long been 
recognised as flawed, and show little signs of abating.31 The 
more recent problems for health arising from neoliberalism 
are highlighted in the Lancet-University of Oslo Commission 
Report,16 but even there, basic underlying structures of power, 
wealth and global inequality, and their effects on agency and 
governance, are not fully accounted for.
This is why we are sceptical of her idea that “commercial 
diplomacy and new investment strategies” will reshape global 
health governance in a beneficial way or indeed, that current 
new strategic thinking will be adequate to rectify serious 
deficiencies. All of the above observations articulated several 
decades ago, and oft repeated in a variety of ways, seem to 
have little effect on the unfolding of major global crises. For 
example, the responses from the United Nations (UN) and 
wealthy countries to the recent Ebola crisis have amounted 
to little more than recommendations for augmented 
philanthropy to build more resilient public health systems that 
could contain future outbreaks.32-34 In our view, the recently 
successful UN meetings while necessary are insufficient 
and unlikely to lead to viable and successful progress within 
the contemporary paradigms of power as they are actually 
practiced globally.35
Kickbusch’s proposal that global health has the goal of 
“equitable access to health in all regions of the globe” seems like 
wishful thinking given that 70% of the world population lives 
on less than $10 per day.36 This goal would only be remotely 
possible with an entirely differently structured global political 
economy involving understanding of and measures to address 
the interface between the ecological crisis, the financial crisis 
and the crisis of social dislocation, or what we have called 
elsewhere the global organic crisis.13 The health of people can 
no longer be seen as separate from the health of the planet37,38
and wealth measured by growth of GDP is not the only way to 
improve global health.39
Reviews of Global Health Governance
Our final cautionary note is a reminder that an extensive 
review of the principal concerns of global leadership and 
global governance, following the 2008 meltdown of global 
capitalism, concluded that its priorities were to: (1) Sustain 
global capitalism; (2) Enlarge market civilization and 
accelerate its potentials for accumulation of capital; and (3) 
Maintain a condition of de-politicization, quiescence and 
political apathy amongst the population, or else to channel 
and incorporate forms of resistance to prevent political 
contestation on the nature and purposes of the political 
economy and practices of rule. By contrast little has been 
done to address the fundamental and highly negative impacts 
of the financial crisis on the basic livelihoods, life chances and 
health of the vast majority of the world’s population.13
A further key political point concerns the idea of the “rise 
of the rest,” a slogan coined by a member of the US foreign 
policy establishment. However, it reflects what philosophers 
call the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, that is the reification 
of the structures and processes of power that actually exist in 
the world. These continue to rest on concentrated control of 
capital in state formations that are either largely authoritarian 
or undergoing a crisis of representative democracy.40 These 
structures and developments are connected to struggles over 
the intensified exploitation of human beings, non-renewable 
resources, and biosphere.41
We have suggested elsewhere that an alternative paradigm of 
progress should not be based upon “sustainable development” 
as we consider this to be an oxymoron that allows for 
prevailing patterns of capitalist development to continue. By 
contrast we think an alternative concept of progress grounded 
in an understanding of historical structures, political economy 
and ecologically responsible health ethics is sorely needed 
to address global health governance challenges, one that we 
would argue should be premised upon global solidarity and 
the “development of sustainability.”35
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